The impact of the investment in absorptive capacity on transboundary pollution is studied by considering two countries each of them regulating a firm.
Introduction
The ozone layer depletion and global warming are examples of damages engendered by tranfrontier pollution and are caused by the total emissions of gazes such as the carbon dioxide. Transboundary pollution is therefore a negative externality among countries which usually does not lead non-cooperating countries to the Pareto-optimality. Nevertheless, some authors showed that non-cooperating governments can reach the first best under some conditions (Hoel (1997) , Zagonari (1998) ). By developing a static two-country, two-good general equilibrium model, Takarada (2005) investigated the welfare effects of the transfer of pollution abatement technology when cross-border pollution exists. He derived and interpreted the conditions under which technology transfer enriches the donor and the recipient. While the tax competition literature showed that tax rates are set too low in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with respect to the cooperative one, Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) showed that international spillovers from public goods reduce tax competition. Ben showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of firms on the common market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transfrontier pollution.
Our paper differs from the existing literature by the fact that we study transborder pollution using a model where firms can invest in absorptive research to capture part of the original research developed by others. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) were the first to introduce the idea of absorptive capacity in the (process or cost reduction) R&D literature. Contrary to the result in the seminal paper by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) where R&D spillovers are assumed exogenous and cost free, Cohen and Levinthal showed that intra-industry spillovers may encourage R&D investment. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) analyzed a simple non-tournament model of R&D where firms engage to reduce their cost of innovation. She showed that, when spillovers of information are endogenized, non-cooperative firms never disclose any of their information, whereas they will always fully share their information when they cooperate in R&D. Kamien and Zang (2000) modeled a firm's effective R&D level that reflects how both its R&D approach (firm specific or general) and R&D level influence its absorptive capacity. Leahy and Neary (2007) specified a general model of the absorptive capacity process and showed that costly absorption raises the effectiveness of own R&D and lowers the effective spillover coefficient thus weakening the case for encouraging research joint venture (RJV) even if there is complete information sharing between firms. Milliou (2009) showed that the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Hammerschmidt (2006) considered a two-stage game in which R&D plays a dual role: First, it generates new knowledge and second, it develops a firm's absorptive capacity. She found that firms will invest more in R&D to strengthen absorptive capacity when the spillover parameter is higher.
Ben Youssef and Zaccour (2009) considered a duopoly competing in quantities and
where firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. They distinguished between effort carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (original R&D) and effort to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of the knowledge developed by rival. There are also free R&D spillovers between firms. They showed that a regulator can reach the social optimal outcome by implementing a taxation and subsidy policy. The regulator subsidizes at a higher rate original R&D effort than its absorptive capacity counterpart when the free spillovers are high, and the contrary may occur when the free spillovers are low. When the cost of original research is lower than the one of absorptive research, or when the learning parameter of the latter is low, then the socially optimal level of original research is higher than the one of absorptive capacity. The opposite result holds when the cost of absorptive capacity is lower than the one of original research and when the learning parameter is high.
We consider a three-stage game consisting of two identical regulator-firm hierarchies. Each firm produces, while polluting, one good sold on the domestic market. Firms invest in original research which directly reduces their emissions/output ratios. They also invest in absorptive research enabling a firm to benefit from the original research made by the other one. Part of the pollution of firm i is exported to country j. Since each firm constitutes a monopoly polluting the environment, it is regulated. In the first stage, each regulator non-cooperatively announces a tax per-unit of pollution to induce the socially optimal level of pollution and production, a subsidy per-unit of original research to induce the socially optimal level of original research, and a subsidy per-unit of absorptive research to induce the socially optimal level of absorptive capacity. In the second stage, each firm invests in R&D and in the third one they offer their production on the domestic market.
Interestingly, we show that the investment in absorptive research enables noncooperating regulators to better internalize transboundary pollution. The higher is the ability of absorption, the greater is the proportion of transboundary pollution internalized. This constitutes an important result of this paper which is due to the second stage of investment in research. Indeed, transboundary pollution has been mostly studied by static models which showed that transboundary pollution is completely not internalized by non-cooperating countries when the damage function, as in our model, is separable with respect to the pollution remaining at home and the one received from other countries (Mansouri and Ben Youssef (2000) ). Nevertheless, Ben showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of firms on the common market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution.
We also prove that non-cooperating regulators can reach the social optimum by means of the three regulatory instruments defined above.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, in Section 3 we characterize the socially optimal production and R&D levels, in Section 4 we derive the socially optimal regulatory instruments, and in Section 5 we conclude. An appendix contains some proofs.
The model
We consider a symmetric model consisting of two countries and two firms. Firm i located in country i is a regional monopoly and produces good i in quantity q i sold in the domestic market having the following inverse demand
. One reason for the market structure we use is that the markets of the industries that engage in large investments in R&D are usually oligopolistic. Also, we suppose that markets are separated for simplicity.
The production process generates pollution and firms can invest in R&D in order to lower their fixed emission/output ratio. We distinguish between original research, denoted by o i
x , which directly reduces the emission ratio and costs
and absorptive research, denoted by a i
x , which enables a firm to capture part of the original research made by the other firm and costs
For simplicity, we suppose that there is no free R&D spillovers between firms.
The effective R&D level of firm i is:
Where l>0 is a learning or absorptive parameter.
By normalizing the emission per-unit of production to one without innovation, the emission/output ratio of firm i is:
Since firm i is a regional monopoly that pollutes the domestic environment, it is regulated. Each regulator behaves non-cooperatively and maximizes his own social welfare function by using three instruments: 1 an emission-tax per-unit of pollution i t to induce the non-cooperative socially optimal levels of production and pollution, a subsidy per-unit of original R&D level o i r and a subsidy per-unit of absorptive R&D level a i r to induce the non-cooperative socially optimal levels of effective R&D and emission/output ratio. Therefore, each regulator chooses the non-cooperative socially optimal per-unit emission-tax and per-unit R&D subsidies in the first stage given the reaction of his firm which chooses its optimal levels of R&D and production in the second and third stages, respectively. Thus, by backward calculations up to the beginning of the game, we determine the three-stage subgameperfect Nash equilibrium.
If we denote the marginal cost of production by θ>0, the profit of firm i is There are also negative externalities between countries through transborder pollution. Damages caused to country i are The social welfare of a country is equal to the consumer surplus, minus damages and subsidies, plus taxes and the net profit of the domestic firm, and is equal, after simplifications, to:
Notice that taxes and subsidies do not appear in the social welfare function because the tax diminished from the firm's profit is added to the consumer welfare, and the subsidies added to the firm's profit are diminished from the consumer welfare.
The non-cooperative socially optimal production and R&D levels
Each regulator maximizes, respectively in the third and second stages, his social welfare with respect to the production quantity and the R&D levels.
Expression (1) can be written as:
Expression (2) shows that when regulator i chooses his optimal production level in the third stage, then transboundary pollution is completely not internalized since the parameter γ disappears. This is general for static models with a damage function linear with respect to the total pollution, or a separable one with respect to the pollution remaining at home and the one received from other countries. 2 However, when he chooses his optimal level of original research in the second stage, then transboundary pollution is partially internalized when the learning parameter is non nil (l≠0). The higher the absorptive parameter is, the greater proportion of the negative externality is internalized.
Part of this transboundary externality is internalized when a country chooses its level of original research because such a choice, in the case of a positive learning parameter, affects the emission ratio and, therefore, the pollution of the firm of the other country, which, in turn, affects the foreign pollution received.
The first order condition of the regulator i third stage is:
The resolution of (3) gives:
The symmetric expression of (4) is:
A sufficient condition for production quantities to be positive is: At the equilibrium, system (7)- (8) (5), (9) and (10) 
The non-linear equations system (11)- (12), confirms the fact that when the learning parameter is nil (l=0), transboundary pollution is completely not internalized since γ disappears from (11)-(12). The higher l is, the greater proportion of transboundary pollution is internalized.
Proposition 1. The investment in absorptive research enables non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. The higher is the ability of absorption, the greater is the proportion of transboundary pollution internalized.
Solving the non-linear equations system (11)- (12) Proof: See the appendix.
Conjecture. We conjecture that:
This conjecture is logical because when the investment cost parameters are very high, it is socially optimal to not invest in R&D.
The non-cooperative socially optimal emission-tax and R&D subsidies
Given the per-unit emission-tax and the per-unit R&D subsidies announced by the regulator in the first stage, the firm reacts by choosing its optimal research and production levels in the second and third stages, respectively. By backward induction, the firm maximizes in the third stage its net profit with respect to its production, then, in the second stage, it maximizes its net profit with respect to its R&D levels.
The first order condition of firm i third stage is:
The resolution of (13) gives:
The symmetric expression of (14) At the equilibrium, (16) and (17) are simplified by using (13), and the symmetric solutions are given by the following equations system: Since the emission-tax and the R&D subsidies are set to incite firms to reach the socially optimal production and research levels which are i q , o i
x and a i
x , then equations (15), (18) and (19) give the optimal emission-tax and R&D subsidies: Let's notice here that the socially optimal emission-tax and R&D subsidies are not determined directly by maximizing the social welfare function of the regulator in the first stage. They are calculated at the second stage by equalizing the socially optimal production and research levels to those optimal for the firm. In fact, the model is resolved as if it was a two-stage one.
Conclusion
We develop in this paper a non-cooperative and three-stage game played by two regulator-firm hierarchies in presence of transborder pollution and absorptive capacity.
We show that the investment in absorptive research enables non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. The higher the learning parameter of absorptive capacity is, the higher the proportion of transboundary pollution internalized is. Therefore, it is recommended for the international community to make the patent laws more flexible and enabling learning from the research made by others more interesting. In addition, if countries fully cooperate, then transboundary pollution is completely internalized and they reach the first best.
Moreover, countries can implement their non-cooperative socially optimal levels of production and research by using three regulatory instruments which are the perunit emission tax, subsidy of original research and subsidy of absorptive research.
Appendix

A) Second order conditions of the regulators second stage
Consider the Hessian matrix:
By using the first order conditions given by (7) and (8), we can determine the second derivatives constituting matrix S H which can be written as: 
Thus, we have a maximum when 
